ARISTOTLE JUSTICE

ARISTOTLE - JUSTICE

Aristotle finds that two distinct forms of justice are necessary to form a comprehensive theory: general (or universal) justice and particular justice. General justice deals with obeying laws and the relation of virtue to others. Particular justice is placed among the virtues and is divided into two subcategories.

Aristotle begins his discussion of particular justice by providing evidence that Justice is divided into parts and that one of these parts deals with unjust profits from action. First, Aristotle makes note of several vices that are associated with certain activities. Cowardice, for example, is associated with causing a soldier to throw away his shield during a battle (1130a17-19).

Aristotle cites several other examples in which a certain vice causes one to act in a way that does not accord with a virtue. However, there are some cases where a person commits an undesirable act and does not possess a corresponding vice that would usually cause that type of act. Often, Aristotle observes, these acts are caused by overreaching, or getting too large a share. (1130a30-1130b1) “It is therefore, apparent that there exists, apart from the injustice…”; these acts are a particular form of injustice.

This distinction between other vices and injustice is that particular injustice deals with unjust actions that are motivated by unjust gains. In the previous example, the soldier who deserts his comrades in battle and does so out of cowardice is not acting unjustly. However, if the soldier committed the same act motivated by overreaching (pay-off), he would be acting out of particular injustice. Another example is adultery for lust or material gain (1030a25). Because unjust acts are a result of overreaching, they are different from unjust acts in the general sense and as such deserve their own separate place in a discussion of Justice.

Particular justice, however, is not different from Justice as a whole. Neither is particular justice only a part of Justice, it is the same as Justice but since it has a different focus, we give it a different name.

Particular justice deals with what is unfair whereas general justice deals with lawless. Aristotle points out that, "whatever is unfair is lawless, but not everything lawless is unfair" (1130b10).

Aristotle divides particular justice in two parts: (1) distribution of divisible goods and (2) rectification in transactions. The first part relates to members of a community in which it is possible for one person to have more or less of a good than another person. Aristotle cites wealth and honor as two of several divisible goods (1130b31). The second part of particular justice deals with rectification in transactions and this part is itself divided into two parts: voluntary and involuntary.

For Aristotle, the correct distribution of goods is the mean between the extremes of too much and too little, this intermediate is called the fair (1131a10).

The just must fall between what is too much and what is too little and the just requires the distribution to be made between people of equal stature. Aristotle is concerned that, “if the people involved are not equal, they will not [justly] receive equal shares… that is the source of quarrels and accusations.” (1131a20, see footnote).
A final point that Aristotle makes in his discussion of distributive justice is that when two evils must be distributed, the lesser of the evils is the more choice-worthy and as such is the greater good (1131b20).